Sunday, September 14, 2008

Standing Committee of the National People's Congress

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress is a committee of about 150 members of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China , which is convened between plenary sessions of the NPC. It has the constitutional authority to modify legislation within limits set by the NPC, and thus acts as a ''de facto'' legislative body. It is led by a Chairman, China's top legislator, who is conventionally ranked third in China's , after the General Secretary and President, which is usually one person. The current Chairman is Wu Bangguo.

The NPCSC also has the power to interpret laws and constitutional of the PRC. In contrast to other countries in which stare decesis gives the power of both final interpretation and adjudication to a supreme court, within the People's Republic of China constitutional and legal interpretation is considered to be a legislative activity rather than a judicial one, and the functions are split so that the NPCSC provides legal interpretations and the Supreme People's Court and the Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region actually decide cases. Because an interpretation of the NPCSC is legislative in nature and not judicial, as it does not affect cases which have already been decided.

A notable use of the latter power occurred in 1999 during the dispute of the in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. In the case, the NPCSC interpreted the in accordance with the position taken by the Hong Kong government with respect to the eligibility of permanent residency in Hong Kong.

Leading members


* Chairman :
** Wu Bangguo

* Vice Chairpersons:
** Wang Zhaoguo
** Lu Yongxiang
** Uyunqimg
** Han Qide
** Hua Jianmin
** Chen Zhili
** Zhou Tienong
** Li Jianguo
** Ismail Tiliwaldi
** Jiang Shushen
** Chen Changzhi
** Yan Junqi
** Sang Guowei

Chairmen of the Standing Committee


* Liu Shaoqi
* Zhu De
* Vacant
* Ye Jianying
* Peng Zhen
* Wan Li
* Qiao Shi
* Li Peng
* Wu Bangguo

Public records in China

Dang'an is a Chinese word meaning "record". Used in the political and administrative context, it means an archival system that records the "performance and attitudes" of citizens of mainland China. Together with the hukou, it has been an important part of the government's efforts to maintain social stability. Majority of the records are kept by the local archives bureaus, some by the State Archives Administration of China at the national level.

Contents


The Dang'an includes information typically found in a : physical characteristics, employment record, photograph, etc. However, it also contains many other documents that would be considered private in some other cultures. According to Wang Fei-ling and other sources, this includes appraisals by supervisors and peers, academic reports from primary school to university, professional credentials, any criminal convictions or administrative penalties, club/society memberships, employment records and political history . Some of the material is composed by the subject. Even the death certificate and eulogy may be placed in the file.


There are two copies for adults: one held on behalf of their work unit by its supervisory organization, and the other at the local Public Security Bureau . Access to dang'an is strictly controlled. Citizens do not usually see their dang'an, although they may ask a Communist Party member to check it for them. Alterations may only be carried out by special cadres, and when combined with the custom of guanxi the result is that "Personal revenge, false entries and special favors are thus part of the game."

A Montreal-based human rights group has claimed that the PSB in the process of computerizing the hundreds of millions of dang'an.

Significance


During the Maoist era, these dossiers were consulted by work unit officials as they made decisions about the major life events of those under their control. Urban residents were assigned jobs by the state. Thereafter, permission from the work unit was needed for marriage, childbirth and transferring the dang'an . During the Cultural Revolution era, there even used to determine which individuals and families would be sent to carry out manual labour in the countryside, under the ''theory of bloodlines''. As late as 2003, academic Zhou Jinghao could write that "A work unit controls employees basically through the dangan system. An employee cannot transfer to another work unit without his dangan."

As has proceeded, the situation has been less clear-cut, as the dang'an system conflicts with market-oriented labour contracts. Graduates have been able to choose their own employment since the mid 1990s in most regions , and marriage has not required work unit consent since 2003. Some private companies in prosperous Guangdong do not even require access to the files, which remains with the employee's . However, individuals may still be granted or denied passports, promotions and other benefits based on information in their dang'an. According to BBC journalist Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, "A black mark against you – a bad school report, a disagreement with your boss, a visit to a psychiatrist – all can travel with you for the rest of your life…" They are also used in investigations by the Ministry of State Security.



Limitations of the dang'an system


An embryonic dang'an is created when individuals enter the school system. This is similar to the permanent file of a school student in some Western school systems, and is transferred from school to school, but is required for entry to university or a work unit, to which the file is then transferred. Millions of peasants, who work on family farms and small businesses, never acquire a dang'an. Those who do are classified as either cadres or workers . It is difficult to cross this boundary.

According to Zhou, "private and foreign-funded enterprises are no longer required to receive the dang'an when they hire employees." Instead, foreign firms transfer them to the .

The future of dang'an was questioned by Qiao Shi, 's number three leader in the mid-90s. In 1996, he proposed to the National People's Congress that the dang'an system be abolished. Both Qiao and the proposal fell out of favour the following year.

Influence in US culture


The right-wing activist John Taylor Gatto frequently refers to dang'an in his critique of the US school system.

President of the People's Republic of China

The President of the People's Republic of China is the head of state of the People's Republic of China. The office was created by the . Formally, the President is elected by the National People's Congress in accordance with Article 62 of the Constitution. In practice, this election falls into the category of . The candidate is recommended by the Presidium of the National People's Congress.

The term ''Zhuxi'' refers to the ''chairman'' in a committee, and was translated as such prior to the 1982 constitution . The official translation switched to ''President'' after 1982 in conformity with Western terminology. However, ''Zhuxi'' stayed in Chinese, and in other contexts still corresponds to ''chairman'' in English. Meanwhile, the translation of English term ''President'' as the head of other states remained ''Zongtong'' , causing a bit of confusion with regard to usage.

Selection, succession and requirements



According to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, the National People's Congress , in theory China's top law-making body, has the power to elect and force the resignation of the President. By law, the President must be a Chinese citizen of 45 years of age or older. The President cannot serve for over two successive terms, a term being the equivalent of one session of the NPC, which is five years.

The President promulgates statutes adopted by the NPC and NPCSC. The President also has the power to appoint the Premier, Vice-Premiers, State Council members, all ambassadors to foreign countries, Ministers of all departments, and all legislative committee chairs, treasurers and secretaries. The President has the power to give Special Presidential Decrees, and can declare State of Emergency, and declare War. The President is assisted by the .

In the event that the President dies or leaves office, the Vice-President automatically assumes presidential powers. In the event that they both are unable to perform normal duties, the Chairman of the National People's Congress will perform the duties of the President as Acting President until the NPC can elect a new President.

President and the state


As the President is legally China's head of state, he is responsible for China's foreign affairs. Since the early 1990s, the President has generally been responsible for establishing general policy and direction for the state and leaves responsibility for the implementation details to the Premier of the People's Republic of China, who is the head of government. In marked contrast to the system of the Soviet Union where the head of state was a powerless figurehead, the Chinese Presidency has grown to be quite a powerful position.

President and the Party


Also since the 1990s, it has been general practice for the President to also serve as the General Secretary of the Communist Party.

It is key for the general secretary to seal his power by adding the presidency to his powerful collection of titles. This effectively removes any power tension between the top communist leader and the Head of State.

President and the military


The relationship between the President and the military is a bit more murky. The potential for conflict is lessened when, as during the Jiang era, the President is also chairman of the state . However, there is a source of potential conflict when this is not the case, shown by the situation in 2003 when top communist leader Hu Jintao was elected President without being elected the CMC chair. In addition, most of the members of both the Party and the State Central Military Commission are uniformed senior generals, giving the People's Liberation Army a degree of autonomy. This autonomy, however, is limited by the existence of s.

In principle, when the President is also party general secretary, he could order the Party Central Military Commission to order the state Central Military Commission to do something, however how this would work in a crisis is unclear.

There have been proposals to constitutionally change the system of command to form a National Security Council, modelled after the National Security Council of the United States, which would give the President undisputed command of the military which would then be just another ministry. These proposals were not actively discussed because of opposition from senior generals. In September 2004, Jiang stepped down as Chairman of the commission, and President Hu Jintao became the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Liberation Army.

History of the presidency


After the implementation of the Constitution of People's Republic of China in 1954, Mao Zedong, who had served as the Chairman of the Central People's Government since 1949, was selected Chairman of the People's Republic of China. Mao, who was also Chairman of the Communist Party of China and Chairman of the , was clearly the most powerful person in China. In the , the President of the PRC was intended to be very powerful, serving both as the Head of State, and the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The president had special powers to call upon emergency meetings during a crisis or concerns of national security.

After his failures in the Great Leap Forward, Mao decided to give up the State presidency in 1959. He was succeeded to this post by Liu Shaoqi, who along with Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, took on a more active role in government to curb the excesses of the Great Leap Forward and restore Soviet-based centrally planned economy. However, in 1966, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution to re-assert his personal power and overthrow the Liu government. The state and party apparatus broke down and in 1968, Chairman Liu Shaoqi was arrested and humiliated by the .

Chairman Liu died in prison and he was not replaced. Mao concentrated powers centrally into the hands of the Party Chairman, and the CMC Chairman, which were further exercised by various Revolutionary Committees. The ceremonial duties associated with the Head of State were subsequently passed to the Chairman of the National People's Congress, the national legislature. The exact reason why Mao Zedong refused to reinstate the presidency was unclear, however it is now known that Mao did not want his political struggle with Liu Shaoqi to be remembered as his attempt to claim the title of the presidency for himself. Lin Biao, then China's number-two figure, advocated for the reinstatement of the position of President, with Mao taking the position and himself becoming Vice-President. Mao later considered this to be a threat to his power, as the Vice-President can legally succeed the President in the event of the latter's death. But during the early 1980s, it became clearer that China needed a person to serve as the Head of State, albeit completely ceremonial. Soong Ching-ling, the widow of Sun Yat-sen and former vice-chairwoman of PRC, was named to be the Honorary President of the PRC before the passage of the Constitution of 1982.

In the Constitution of 1982, the President was conceived of as a figurehead head of state with actual state power resting in the hands of the Premier of the People's Republic of China and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, both of which were conceived of as being separate people; the President will only hold the office of the President, and not intervene directly in matters of the State Council or the Party. The President therefore held minor responsibilities such as greeting foreign dignitaries, and signing the appointment of embassy staff. In the original 1982 Constitution plan, the would develop policy, the state would execute it, and the power would be divided to prevent a cult of personality from forming as it did with the case of Mao Zedong. Thus in 1982, China perceivably had four main leaders: Hu Yaobang, the Party General Secretary; Zhao Ziyang, the Premier; Li Xiannian, the President; and Deng Xiaoping, the "Paramount Leader", holding title of the Chairman of the CMC.

Subsequent events, however, caused the office to have much larger powers than was originally intended. In 1989, then President Yang Shangkun was able in cooperation with the then Chairman of the Deng Xiaoping to use the office of the President to declare martial law in Beijing and order the military crackdown of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. This was in direct opposition to the wishes of Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and probably a majority of the .

In the 1990s, the experiment of separating party and state posts, which led to bitter division, was terminated, and in 1992, the post of President was taken by Jiang Zemin, who as General Secretary and chief of the Central Military Commission continued to make the office of the President a powerful position. When Jiang Zemin stepped down in 2003, the offices of General Secretary and President were once again both given to one man, then Vice-President Hu Jintao.

Premier of the People's Republic of China

The Premier of the State Council , sometimes incorrectly referred to as the "Prime Minister", is the Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of China . This position was originally known as Premier of the Political Council and changed to its current name in 1954. The Premier is formally approved by the National People's Congress upon the nomination of the . In practice, both the President and the Premier are selected after high level negotiations within the Communist Party of China. The Premier is always a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Powers


The Premier is responsible for organizing and administering the Chinese civil bureaucracy. This includes overseeing the various ministeries, departments, commissions and statutory agencies. Significantly, the Premier does not have authority over the People's Liberation Army. In recent years, there has been a division of responsibilities between the Premier and the President of the People's Republic of China in which the Premier is responsible for the technical details of implementing government policy while the President gathers the political support necessary for government policy.

The premier is always supported by four vice premiers.

Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China

The Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China is a committee whose membership varies between 5 and 9 people, usually men, and includes the top leadership of the Communist Party of China. The inner workings of the PSC are not well known, although it is believed that decisions of the PSC are made by consensus. Formally the membership of the Committee is approved by the . In practice, the membership of the PSC is the result of negotiations among the top leadership of the Communist Party.

Currently the Politburo Standing Committee acts as the ''de facto'' highest decision-making body in China. Its membership is closely followed by both the national media as well as political watchers abroad. Historically, the role of the PSC has varied and evolved. During the Cultural Revolution, for example, the PSC had little power.

History


Throughout its existence, the actual power wielded by the PSC has varied widely from period to period. In the early days of the Cultural Revolution, for example, real power was concentrated in the Central Committee Cultural Revolution Group, which was nominally subject to the Politburo Standing Committee but in fact dominated over the Standing Committee. In 1969, the Cultural Revolution Group was abolished, with those of its members who were most loyal to admitted into the PSC. The last years of the Cultural Revolution were dominated by internal chaos, and following Mao's death in October 1976, only two PSC members continued their official duties; namely, Ye Jianying and Hua Guofeng. Five of the Committee members had died in the last year, one had been dismissed, and two were "quarantined for investigation".

After taking power in 1978, one of the goals of Deng Xiaoping was to strengthen the power of the party, a goal which he ironically undermined in 1989 when he ordered the military to intervene in the Tiananmen Protests of 1989 against the wishes of a majority of the PSC, and in which the party subsequently ousted a majority of the PSC.

Although Jiang Zemin stepped down from this powerful committee to make way for a younger of leadership led by Hu Jintao, Jiang may continue to wield significant influence. Five or six out of the nine new members of the Standing Committee, Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong, Li Changchun and sometimes Wu Guanzheng are Jiang protégés. The 22-member is elected by the Party's central committee. At the 2002 16th Party Congress, the Standing Committee was expanded to include nine members. The PSC has always included an odd number of members to avoid deadlocks. For speculations about the incoming PSC members, see Generations of Chinese leadership.

Current members





''note: current order may be temporary, although they will be employed for the time being by state media. The of the remaining five will be determined as their portfolios are modified.''

Historical makeup of the PSC



16th PSC :

* Hu Jintao - President of the People's Republic of China, General Secretary of the CPC, Chairman of the .
* Wu Bangguo - Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
* Wen Jiabao - of the State Council of the People's Republic of China
* Jia Qinglin - Chairman of the People's Political Consultative Conference
* Zeng Qinghong - Vice-President of the People's Republic of China
* Huang Ju, Vice-Premier, died in office June 2007
* Wu Guanzheng - Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
* Li Changchun - no other positions held, known to many as the propaganda chief
* Luo Gan - Political and Legislative Affairs Committee secretary

Interestingly, all nine members of the 16th PSC are university trained engineers.

15th PSC
* Jiang Zemin
* Li Peng
* Zhu Rongji
* Li Ruihuan
* Hu Jintao
* Wei Jianxing
* Li Lanqing

14th PSC
* Jiang Zemin - President
* Li Peng - Premier
* Qiao Shi - NPC Standing Committee Chairman
* Li Ruihuan - CPPCC Chairman
* Zhu Rongji - Executive Vice-Premier
* Liu Huaqing - CMC Vice-Chairman
* Hu Jintao - Vice-President

13th PSC
* Li Peng - Premier
* Hu Qili
* Qiao Shi
* Yao Yilin
* Zhao Ziyang - General Secretary

12th PSC
* Deng Xiaoping - Chairman of the Central Military Commission
* Chen Yun
* Hu Yaobang - General Secretary
* Li Xiannian - State President
* Ye Jianying
* Zhao Ziyang - Premier

11th PSC
* Deng Xiaoping
* Hua Guofeng
* Li Xiannian
* Wang Dongxing
* Ye Jianying

10th PSC
* Mao Zedong
* Zhou Enlai
* Wang Hongwen
* Zhu De
* Ye Jianying
* Dong Biwu
* Kang Sheng
* Li Desheng
* Zhang Chunqiao
* Deng Xiaoping
* Hua Guofeng

9th PSC
* Mao Zedong - Chairman of the Party
* Lin Biao - Vice-Chairman of the Party
* Chen Boda
* Zhou Enlai - Premier
* Kang Sheng

8th PSC
* Mao Zedong - Chairman of the Party
* Zhou Enlai - Premier
* Chen Yun
* Deng Xiaoping - General Secretary
* Lin Biao - Minister of Defence
* Liu Shaoqi - State President
* Zhu De - Grand Marshal

7th "De facto" PSC Often known as the "Big Five". Note: PSC originally termed the Party "Secretariat"
* Mao Zedong - Chairman of the Party
* Zhou Enlai - Premier
* Chen Yun
* Liu Shaoqi
* Zhu De

Overseas Chinese Affairs Office

The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China is the administrative office responsible for liaising with overseas Chinese residing abroad or returning to China. Its forerunner, the Committee of Overseas Chinese Affairs, was established in 1949; He Xiangning, the wife of Liao Zhongkai, served as its first head from October 1949 to April 1959, after which her son Liao Chengzhi took over the position of head until the abolishment of the office in June 1970. Upon the establishment of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office in 1978, Liao Chengzhi also became its first head. Liao Chengzhi's son Liao Hui also joined the office as vice-director in 1983, and was promoted to director in May 1984.

Administration


*Minister: Li Haifeng
*Vice Ministers: Zhao Yang, Xu Yousheng, Ma Rupei, Ren Qiliang
*Chief of Discipline Inspection Group: Lin Wenken

National security of the People's Republic of China

This article is about the National security of the People's Republic of China. It includes the coordination of a variety of organizations, including , military, paramilitary, , and whose aim is to protect China's national security.

Armed forces overview


The armed forces of China are officially and collectively known as the People's Liberation Army . The ground forces are referred to simply as the PLA, but the navy is called the PLA Navy and the air force is known as the PLA Air Force. The PLA's independent strategic missile forces are often referred to as the PLA Second Artillery Corps. The Chinese Communist Party Central Military Commission sets policy for the PLA. The commission, which is chaired by China's president, has three vice chairmen, each a general in the PLA ground forces, and seven members representing various components of the PLA. Operational control is administered dually by the CCP Central Military Commission and the State Central Military Commission and the . PLA headquarters is organized into the General Staff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department, and General Armaments Department. In 2005 China announced that it downsized its military by 200,000 troops in order to optimize force structures and increase combat capabilities. The active-duty troop numbers declined to 2.3 million, compared to 3.2 million in 1987. The changes included eliminating layers in the command hierarchy, reducing noncombat units, such as schools and farms, and reprogramming officer duties. The number of ground forces was reduced by the largest margin, while the navy, air force, and Second Artillery Corps were strengthened. An estimated 1.7 million military personnel are in the ground forces, 250,000 in the navy , an estimated 400,000 to 420,000 in the air force, and 90,000–100,000 in the strategic missile forces. Reservists number an estimated 500,000 to 600,000 and paramilitary forces in the People's Armed Police an estimated 1.5 million.

The Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China is constitutionally different from the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party. According to Article 93 of the state constitution, the state Central Military Commission directs the armed forces of the country and is composed of a chairman, vice chairmen, and members whose terms run concurrently with the National People's Congress. The commission is responsible to the NPC and its Standing Committee.

Foreign military relations


China sold US$800 million worth of arms and military equipment to a variety of nations in 2002, making it the world's fifth largest arms supplier after the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, and France. Among its principal clients have been Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Pakistan, and Yemen. China also provides military assistance to other countries, such as Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, and Vanuatu. The China North Industries Group Corporation , China's main defense producer, has some 100 joint ventures and more than 80 overseas offices and branches in 30 countries and regions involved in military and dual-use technology production and sales. Further, China is also a major arms buyer, mostly naval and air force equipment from Russia. In 2004 China gave unprecedented access to senior foreign military officers at a military demonstration in Henan Province. Officers from 15 Asian nations and Russia were present. In 2005 China and Russia held joint eight-day "Peace Mission 2005" military maneuvers near Vladisvostok and in Shandong Province and nearby waters. Air, land, and amphibious exercises were held.

China is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization , a joint effort with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The SCO was established as the Shanghai Five when the partners signed agreements on strengthening mutual trust in military fields in border areas in 1996 and on mutual reduction of military forces in border areas in 1997. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and the entry of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces into Central Asia, the SCO was formed and members began to hold joint counterterrorism military exercises. In 2004 the SCO initiated a regional antiterrorism structure to crack down on various transnational terrorist and criminal activities. China also has held joint naval and counterterrorism exercises with Pakistan. The naval exercise, which occurred in the East China Sea, was the first such drill with a foreign counterpart, as Chinese sources put it, "in a non-traditional security field." The antiterrorism exercise, which was held in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, involved border guards from both sides.

External threat


Even while embroiled in the problems of territorial disputes with its neighbors and the dangers of periodic tensions on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait, China perceives the United States as its major threat. Beijing believes that the United States still maintains its Cold War policy toward China and the Asia-Pacific region and stresses ideological differences and their relationship to security issues of concern in the region. In China’s view, Washington’s attitude exacerbates tensions, which, in turn, lead to international turmoil. Post-Soviet Russia is now fairly benign in China’s view, and relations have improved significantly from the days of border conflicts and high-level tension. Concerns about the remilitarization of Japan also resurface on occasion, often as a legacy of World War II enmity. Transnational crime, terrorism, separatism, and contradictions among nations all contribute to China’s security concerns.

Defense budget


Although China claims that the share of defense spending as a percentage of the overall state budget has declined from 17.4 percent in 1979 to 9.5 percent in 1994 and 7.7 percent in 2004, the government has announced double-digit increases in military spending nearly every year for more than a decade. The defense budget for 2006 is expected to reach US$35.1 billion, the largest increase in four years and 16 percent higher than 2005 . The report submitted in March 2006 at the Fourth Session of the 10th National People’s Congress contained a request for a budget increase to strengthen China’s defensive capability and ability to respond to emergencies and to raise officer and enlisted pay levels. The NPC stated that China’s military spending is still low compared to the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan. However, the actual defense budget is likely to be higher than expected because of the inclusion of defense-related items in nondefense budgets.

Major military units


The ground forces are organized into seven military regions , 28 provincial military districts, four centrally controlled garrison commands , and 21 integrated group armies. The group armies have strengths between 30,000 and 65,000 troops. Each group army typically has two or three infantry divisions, one armored division or brigade, one artillery division or brigade, and one joint surface-to-air missile or antiaircraft artillery brigade or simply an antiaircraft artillery brigade.

The navy is organized into North Sea , East Sea , and South Sea fleets. Each fleet has destroyer, submarine, and coastal patrol flotillas, possibly even amphibious flotillas, and naval air stations. There are numerous major naval bases: the North Sea Fleet has seven, the East Sea Fleet eight, and the South Sea Fleet 16.

The air force has five air corps and 32 air divisions. The major air force headquarters coincide with the seven military regions. The air force has more than 140 air bases and airfields, including ready access to China’s major regional and international airports.

The strategic missile forces, or Second Artillery Corps, are organized into seven missile divisions based in the military regions, with the central headquarters at Qinghe, north of Beijing. There also are training and testing bases. The six operational bases had some 21 launch brigades in 2005.

Major military equipment


The major ground forces equipment includes an estimated 7,000 main battle tanks, 1,200 light tanks, 5,000 armored personnel carriers, 14,000 pieces of towed artillery, 1,700 pieces of self-propelled artillery, 2,400 multiple-rocket launchers, 7,700 air defense guns, 6,500 antitank guided weapons, and unspecified numbers of mortars, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, and antitank guns. The ground forces also have an estimated 321 helicopters and an unspecified number of unmanned air vehicles and surveillance aircraft.

Among its principal combatant ships, the navy has 68 submarines . One is a Xia class submarine-launched ballistic missile force strategic-capability submarine. There are plans for more advanced SSBNs by the end of the decade. The navy also has an estimated 21 destroyers and 42 frigates, as well as 368 fast-attack craft, 39 mine warfare ships, 10 hovercraft, 6 troop transports, 19 landing-ship/tank ships, 37 medium landing ships, 45 utility landing craft, 10 air-cushioned landing craft, 163 support and miscellaneous craft, 8 submarine support ships, 4 salvage and repair ships, 29 supply ships, 1 multirole aviation ship, and about 700 land-based combat aircraft and 45 armed helicopters. China also has plans to launch a 40,000-ton aircraft carrier by 2010.

The air force has some 1,900 combat aircraft, including armed helicopters. The inventory includes 180 bombers, more than 950 fighters and 838 ground attack fighters, an estimated 290 reconnaissance/electronic intelligence aircraft, an estimated 513 transports, an estimated 170 helicopters, some 200 training aircraft, and an unmanned aerial vehicle. Weapons include air-to-air missiles and ground-based air defense artillery using surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery.

The strategic missile forces have in their inventory 20 or more intercontinental ballistic missiles , between 130 and 150 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, one Xia class submarine carrying 12 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and about 335 or more short-range ballistic missiles.

Military service


There is selective conscription of two years for all the services starting at age 18 for males. In 2004 there were some 136,000 women in the armed forces.

Paramilitary Forces


The principal paramilitary organization is the People’s Armed Police Force. There are militia forces of indeterminate strength under the control of the Chinese Communist Party . Once a critical part of Mao Zedong’s “people’s war” strategy, militia units are no longer an essential part of China’s military and have mostly disbanded.

Military Forces Abroad



In 2004 China deployed 95 riot police officers as part of a 125-member unit to Haiti for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, a nation with which Beijing does not have diplomatic relations. As of that time, China had deployed 297 peacekeepers to five other nations, including East Timor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Liberia, Afghanistan, and the autonomous province of Kosovo in Serbia and Montenegro. China also has sent peacekeeping observers to Ethiopia and Eritrea, various Middle Eastern countries, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, and Western Sahara. It is a formal participant in the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Mission in Sierra Leone, UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and UN Mission in Liberia.

Police and Internal Security


The security apparatus is made up of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Public Security, the People’s Armed Police, the People’s Liberation Army , and the state judicial, procuratorial, and penal systems. The Ministry of Public Security oversees all domestic police activity in China, including the People’s Armed Police Force. The ministry is responsible for police operations and prisons and has dedicated departments for internal political, economic, and communications security. Its lowest organizational units are public security stations, which maintain close day-to-day contact with the public. The People’s Armed Police Force, which sustains an estimated total strength of 1.5 million personnel, is organized into 45 divisions: internal security police, border defense personnel, guards for government buildings and embassies, and police communications specialists.

The Ministry of State Security was established in 1983 to ensure “the security of the state through effective measures against enemy agents, spies, and counterrevolutionary activities designed to sabotage or overthrow China’s socialist system.” The ministry is guided by a series of laws enacted in 1993, 1994, and 1997 that replaced the “counterrevolutionary” crime statutes. The ministry’s operations include intelligence collection, both domestic and foreign. Authorities have used arrests on charges of revealing state secrets, subversion, and common crimes to suppress political dissent and social advocacy.

Internal Threat and Terrorism


Although the government defines the outlawed Falun Gong movement as the major internal threat and the People’s Armed Police Force actively pursues its members, Falun Gong is, nevertheless, not classified as a terrorist group, and it has not committed or sponsored acts of violence. Muslim separatists in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region present China with its most significant terrorist threat, which emerged in the late 1980s. In 2003 Beijing published an “East Turkistan Terrorist List,” which labeled organizations such as the World Uighur Youth Congress and the East Turkistan Information Center as terrorist entities. These groups openly advocate independence for “East Turkestan,” and, although they have not been publicly linked to violent activity, the separatists have resorted to violence, bomb attacks, assassinations, and street fighting, which Beijing responds to with police and military action. During the summer of 2004, elite troops from China and Pakistan held joint antiterrorism exercises in Xinjiang that were aimed at the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, an organization listed as terrorist by China, the United States, and the United Nations . This and other Uygur separatist groups reputedly were trained in Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban and al Qaeda. The East Turkistan Islamic Movement was established in 1990 and has links to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which operates throughout Central Asia. Premier Wen Jiabao joined leaders of other Asian and European nations in Hanoi for the October 2004 Asia-Europe Meeting in Hanoi, where the delegates reaffirmed their call for a war on terrorism led by the UN.